This paper re-examines the rank-dependent expected utility theory. Firstly, we follow Quiggin's assumption (Quiggin 1982) to deduce the rank-dependent expected utility formula over lotteries and hence extend it to the case of general random variables. Secondly, we utilize the distortion function which reflects decision-makers' beliefs to propose a distorted independence axiom and then to prove the representation theorem of rank-dependent expected utility. Finally, we make direct use of the distorted independence axiom to explain the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect.
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the independence axiom (IA), the key behavioral assumption of the expected utility (EU) theory, is often violated in practice in experimental studies. Amongst other theories, the anticipated utility (AU) theory, which is also known as rank-dependent expected utility -RDEU (Quiggin 1982 , Segal 1989 , and Quiggin and Wakker 1994 , has successfully resolved this issue. There exist several axiomatic systems for this theory. The weak certainty equivalent substitution axiom in Quiggin (1982) and Quiggin and Wakker (1994) implies that the weights function maps 1 2 to 1 2 .
1 However, such an assumption takes a lot of power out of this theory. Segal (1989) utilizes a measure approach to axiomatize RDEU theory. He proposes a projection IA to graphically compare two cumulative distribution functions (or lotteries), which lacks normative appeal. Here we propose a new axiomatic foundation to RDEU. In our opinion, the weights function in RDEU reflects decision-makers' beliefs and their attitude to risks, and therefore can be treated as exogenous. Based on the weights function, we propose a distorted independence axiom (DIA) and establish a new axiomatic system to build the distorted theory of RDEU. This paper also shows how DIA can be used directly to determine the specific forms of weights function under which some examples violating IA would no longer be paradoxical.
We first follow the assumption in Quiggin (1982) and Quiggin and Wakker (1994) that the transformation of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) is continuous on the whole probability distribution. Applying the reduction of lottery dimensions we prove the RDEU formula over lotteries and show that it also holds for general (continuous) random variables. Quiggin's assumption is a breakthrough in successfully extending EU to RDEU. The essence of the von Neumann -Morgenstern EU theory is a set of restrictions imposed on the preference relations over lotteries that allows their representation by a mathematical expectation of a real function on the set of outcomes. One main aspect of this theory is the specific functional form of the representation, namely, the linearity in probabilities. The EU hypothesis is widely used in various disciplines. However, it sometimes fails to explain some counterexamples. Quiggin (1982) successfully resolves this issue by proposing that probability weights of every prospect are derived from the entire original probability distribution. He tries a special case of three outcomes and writes the general form of his RDEU formula. Segal (1987a) claims that this formula can be extended to any (one-stage) lottery. In this paper we prove Quiggin's RDEU formula over prospects by using the continuity of utility function (von Neumann -Morgenstern) and further generalize this formula for arbitrary random variables. For the case of general random variables we employ Helly theorem to prove the RDEU formula.
Then we re-axiomatize the RDEU theory along the line of Quiggin (1982) , Chew (1985) and Segal (1989) , using the methods in Fishburn (1982) and Yaari (1987) . In the RDEU formula the transformation of CDFs or the deci-sion weights function reflects decision-makers' beliefs. It 'distorts' prospects' probability distributions to reflect a decision maker's own evaluation of probabilities. Therefore we call it the distortion function. We can interpret the distortion function as the decision-maker's attitude to risk when choosing among lotteries. In this paper we assume that this distortion function is exogenous. We observe that the distortion function is also a CDF and can be represented by a random variable. Therefore, the distorted CDF also corresponds to a random variable, which is a compound of the inverse of the CDF of a risky prospect and the random variable corresponding to the distortion function. From this approach we provide our DIA, and hence prove the representation theorem of RDEU by modifying EU. The format of the distorted independence axiom (DIA) is analogous to IA, but in DIA we use a mixture operator instead of the conventional addition. The independence, instead of being hypothesized for convex combinations formed along the CDFs, is postulated for convex combinations formed along the distorted CDFs. Therefore, while IA is applied to the family of CDFs, DIA is applied to the distorted CDFs.
We can use DIA directly to rationalize the most famous "paradoxes" in uncertainty theory such as the Allais paradox (or the common consequences effect) and the common ratio effect (or the certainty effect) without resorting to the RDEU formula as in Segal (1987a) . We use the distortion function to transform the unit triangle in Machina (1987) to obtain triangles under the framework of DIA. In the new unit triangles, indifference curves keep parallel but positions of prospects change such that lines of compared prospect pairs may not parallel. We show that the compared prospects form parallelograms in the transformed unit triangle if and only if DIA reduces to IA. In this case the inconsistency in these paradoxes would arise. Furthermore, we are able to show that in the transformed unit triangle under DIA, when the distortion function takes specific forms such that the lines of compared prospect pairs fan in, the behavioral patterns in these examples may be rational. Our approach here fundamentally departs from that of Machina (1987) . In his diagrams, prospects are fixed and form parallelograms while indifference curves fan out.
The RDEU theory has received several axiomatizations. In Quiggin (1982) and Quiggin and Wakker (1994) , a preference relation satisfies a set of axioms including the key weak certainty equivalent substitution axiom if and only if it has an expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities where the probability transformation function maps 1 2 to 1 2 . As Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) , Röell (1987) and Segal (1987a) suggest, risk aversion holds in this theory if and only if von Neumann-Morgendtern utility function is concave and the weights function is convex. Assuming that the weights function maps 1 2 to 1 2 takes much power out of the theory. Chew (1985) shows that the latter restriction is not necessary. Segal (1989) presents another set of axioms to prove RDEU by a measure representation approach. His projection IA is of a simple mathematical form which, in our opinion, is lack of interpretations in terms of behavioral foundations. Yaari (1987) also suggests an expected utility theory with rank-dependent probabilities, but with the roles of payment and probability reversed. He cites Fishburn's (1982) five axioms in EU and replaces IA with the dual IA. Our paper presents a more appealing axiomatic system for RDEU by replacing the dual IA in Yaari (1987) with our DIA. To some extent, Yaari's theory can be treated as a special case of our distorted theory of RDEU. The difference is that in RDEU the utility function is endogenous and the distortion function is exogenous while in Yaari the endogeneity of these two is reversed. Our paper further differs from Yaari (1987) in that all random variables in Yaari's model take values in the unit interval so that the inverse of a CDF is still a CDF, but in our model random variables take values from any (closed) interval. We use the distortion function which is also a CDF to "distort" the CDF of a risky prospect.
There are other papers on RDEU. Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) and Karni (1987) study the risk aversion in expected utility theory with rankdependent probabilities and state-dependent preferences. The RDEU approach can be used not only to explain the examples with uncertainty such as the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect, but also to interpret the Ellsberg paradox (Segal 1987b) . Furthermore, Karni and Schmeidler (1991) summarize the utility theory with uncertainty. On the other hand, RDEU can be used to explain ambiguity aversion, as Miao(2004 Miao( , 2009 ) and Zou (2006) . This paper is composed of five sections. In section 2 we formally generalize the RDEU formula from Quiggin (1982) and Quiggin and Wakker (1994) . In section 3 we propose an axiomatic system with DIA and prove the representation theorem of RDEU. Section 4 explains the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect by directly using DIA, in addition to using the RDEU formula. Section 5 concludes this paper.
RANK-DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY FORMULA
This section outlines the RDEU theory, which represents decision makers' preferences using mathematical expectations of a utility function with respect to a transformation of probabilities on a set of outcomes. The transformation function can be found by induction, and generally is not a linear function of the CDF. Each component of the transformation is a function of the whole probability distribution of the prospect and does not depend upon the winning probability of this prize only. For the case of discrete random variables we show that, for any natural number N = 1, 2, · · · , the N -th component is an increment of the transformation of the sum of the winning probabilities for the smallest N − 1 outcomes. Further, we can extend the EDRU formula to a more general one by using a convergence theorem of CDFs.
Consider a compact interval [m, M ] of monetary prizes. Let L be the set of lotteries (probability measures) over [m, M ] and L 0 in L be the set of lotteries with finite support. For each X ∈ L , its CDF of X is defined by F X (x) = P {X ≤ x} for x ∈ [m, M ].
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Now we build the RDEU theory on L 0 . For any natural number N = 1, 2, · · · , denote
as a prospect, which yields x N n dollars with probability p N n for n = 1, · · · , N , where
where 
is a transformation of the probability distribution and produces a new probability distribution. Quiggin (1982) assumes that, for
where
Thus we have the RDEU formula in L 0 , which is an assertion in Quggin (1982) .
Theorem 1 (Quiggin 1982) . In the rank-dependent expected utility function (1), the behavior of
on arbitrary probability distributions is fully determined by the values of g as in (2) and (3).
From this theorem, the RDEU function in
From (2) and (3), we have H
is the increment of the transformation of the sum of the first n−1 winning probabilities. Expression (4) can be re-written in a general form as
From the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix, we summarize the property of function g as follows.
Proposition 1. The function g is a continuous and increasing function with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Furthermore, on L we can also prove the rank-dependent expected utility function by using a convergence theorem of CDFs.
Theorem 2. The rank-dependent expected utility function in L is
The RDEU formula describes a class of models of decision making under risk in which risks are represented by CDFs, and preference relations on risks are represented by mathematical expectations of a utility function with respect to a transformation of probabilities on a set of outcomes. The distinguishing characteristic of these models is that the transformed probability of an outcome depends on the rank of the outcomes in the induced preference ordering on the set of outcomes. When the function g reduces to the identity, the RDEU formula reduces to the EU one. However, EU does not depend on the rank of the outcomes.
A REPRESENTATION THEOREM OF RANK-DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY
In this section we axiomatize the RDEU theory, following the axiomatic systems of Fishburn (1982) and Yaari (1987) . We present our five axioms and then prove the representation theorem.
As we know, the existence of von Neumann and Morgenstern EU is equivalent to three axioms: the preference relation axiom, the independence (substitution) axiom, and the Archimedean axiom. The representation of linearity in probabilities in EU is a direct consequence of the restriction on preference relations known as IA. Fishburn (1982) proves the representation theorem of EU from an axiomatic system with five axioms which has been widely used. The five axioms are the neutrality axiom, the complete weak order axiom, the continuity (with respect to L 1 -convergence) axiom, the monotonicity (with respect to first-order stochastic dominance) axiom, and the independence axiom. IA is the key behavioral assumption of EU, which is often violated in experimental studies. Yaari (1987) cites Fishburn's (1982) five axioms and replaces IA with the dual IA, and hence establishes the dual theory of choice under risk. At the core of the dual theory is the dual IA. Yaari (1987) develops an expected utility theory with rank-dependent probabilities (EURDP) with the roles of payments and probabilities reversed. In this paper, we replace the dual IA in Yaari (1987) with our DIA. We then use this system of five axioms to prove the representation theorem of RDEU.
We first describe the five axioms in Yaari (1987) and the representation theorem of EU. A strict preference relation is assumed to be defined on L . Let the symbols and ∼ stand for preference relation and indifference relation, respectively. The following axiom suggests itself: [Axiom A1 -Neutrality]: Let X 1 and X 2 belong to L with respective CDFs F X1 and
Denote F to be a family of CDFs by
is asymmetric and negatively transitive. [Axiom A3 -Continuity with respect to L 1 -Convergence]: Let F 1 , F 2 , F 1 , F 2 belong to F ; assume that F 1 F 2 . Then there exists an ε > 0 such that
[Axiom A5EU -Independence (Substitution)]: If F 1 , F 2 and F belong to F and α is a real number satisfying 0 < α < 1, then F 1
By using the five axioms, Yaari (1987) proves the following representation theorem of EU, which is a modification of Fishburn (1982) .
Theorem 3. A preference relation satisfies Axioms A1 -A4 and A5EU if and only if there exists a continuous and non-decreasing real function u, defined on [m, M ], such that, for all X 1 and X 2 belonging to L ,
Moreover, the function u, which is unique up to a positive transformation, can be selected in such a way that, for all x ∈ [m, M ], u(x) solves the preference equation
From Theorem 3, the expected utility is given by
We now present our DIA and prove the representation theorem of RDEU. The distorted theory of choice under risk is obtained when IA (Axiom A5EU) of EU is replaced. We postulate independence for convex combinations that are formed along the distorted CDFs instead of for convex combinations formed along the CDFs. The best way to achieve that is to consider an appropriately defined distortion of CDFs.
In RDEU (Quiggin 1982 and Segal 1989) , the rank-dependent expected utility value is
is a transformation to change probability distributions. As we have explained in above section, we can treat the function g as exogenous; and we call it the distortion function. Suppose that g satisfies some conditions such that g•F X is a CDF, then we can represent the RDEU value in the form of mathematical expectations. Thus the representation theorem of RDEU can be checked by using Theorem 3 of EU. We now consider the corresponding axiom for independence.
We assume that the distortion function g satisfies Proposition 1. Then the function g is onto and invertible. The inverse of the function g, g 
Proposition 2. Let X ∈ L be a random variable, then F X (X) follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1] . If the random variable θ follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1], for any CDF F , F −1 (θ) follows the CDF F .
If the random variable θ follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], the random variable ξ on [0, 1] can be chosen from Proposition 2 as ξ = g −1 (θ). In fact,
For any CDF F , we consider the compound function g•F of the two CDFs g and F , which is defined by
It is clear that g•F satisfies all the conditions of CDFs. Then g•F is a CDF, and we call it a distorted CDF of CDF F .
For any distorted CDF g•F , we have that
which is the CDF of random variable
We denote the set of such distorted CDFs as
We can simply write
. From the property of Proposition 1 we have F • = F . A mixture operation for distorted CDFs in F
• may now be defined as follows: if g•F 1 and g•F 2 belong to
• is given by
is called a harmonic convex combination of F 1 and F 2 . With the operation ⊕, the set F
• of all distorted CDFs becomes a mixture space. Returning to the preference relation , we are now in a position to state the axiom that gives rise to the distorted theory of choice under risk:
• and α is a real number satisfying 0
Equivalently, this axiom can be written as
• and α is a real number satisfying 0 < α < 1, then
Then we can write DIA in a simple form.
[Axiom A5 -Distorted Independence]: If F 1 , F 2 and F belong to F • and α is a real number satisfying 0 < α < 1, then F 1
From the above axioms, we have the following representation theorem of RDEU by using Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Assume that the distortion function g and its inverse g −1 satisfy Lipschitz conditions. A preference relation satisfies Axioms A1 -A5 if and only if there exists a continuous and non-decreasing real function u, defined on [m, M ], such that, for all X 1 and X 2 belonging to L ,
We first note that g −1 satisfying Lipschitz condition is not required for the proof of the sufficient condition for (6). We also note that from Theorem 4, the rank-dependent expected utility is given by
which is presented in Quiggin (1982) and Segal (1987a and 1989) . Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) Yaari (1987) proposes the dual IA as follows: If F X1 , F X2 and F X in F are pairwise comonotonic and α is a real number satisfying 0 < α < 1, then
Using Axioms A1 -A4 and his dual IA, he then proves his EURDP (Yaari's Theorem of Dual Theory) in which the utility function in payments is linear. The dual utility is given by
If we take the utility function u in Theorem 4 to be linear, then RDEU degenerates into Yaari's dual utility. Yaari's dual utility can be considered as a special case of Quiggin's AU/RDEU. In Theorem 4 of RDEU, the utility function u is endogenous and the distortion function g is exogenous, while, in Yaari's Theorem of Dual Theory, the weights function f 0 (and hence g 0 ) is endogenous but the utility function u is exogenous and linear. Yaari (1987) considers random variables assuming values in the unit in-
; then the inverse of a CDF is also a CDF. However, for a general interval [m, M ] = [0, 1], the inverse of a CDF is not a CDF. Therefore we introduce the distortion function such that the distorted CDF is a CDF. As we have seen earlier, the distorted function is a CDF and there exists a random variable following this distribution; hence we can find the random variable associated with the distorted CDF. This is what leads us to obtain the distorted theory of rank-dependent expected utility.
To unravel the paradoxes in next section, we need to use the specific forms of the RDEU formula. From Theorems 2 and 4, the rank-dependent expected utility value of random variable X ∈ L is
We define a decision-weights function f :
; then it also satisfies f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Therefore the RDEU functional is given by
When we consider a simple lottery X = (
and
The expressions (9) -(10) are more concise formulas of the RDEU theory for discrete random variables.
DIRECT APPLICATIONS OF DISTORTED INDEPENDENCE AXIOM
In this section, we show the significance of DIA. We use DIA directly to rationalize two famous examples -the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect. The two examples are inconsistent with IA and EU, but may agree with RDEU, which can be checked by applying RDEU formulas (9)-(10) (Segal 1987a and 1989) . Using DIA directly, we can determine the functional forms of the distortion function such that the two examples are paradoxical. Furthermore, we look beyond these functional forms and are able to obtain conditions under which the two examples accord with DIA.
In order to explain the roles played by IA and DIA for the two examples, we will use isosceles right triangles in Machina (1987) . As he demonstrates in his well-known article, the set of all prospects over the fixed outcome levels 0 < x < y can be represented by the set of all probability triples of the form (p 0 , p x , p y ) where p 0 = P {X = 0}, p x = P {X = x}, p y = P {X = y}, and p 0 + p x + p y = 1. Graphically, this set of gambles can be represented in two dimensions, in (p 0 , p y ) plane (Figure 1 ), since the third dimension, p x , is implicit in the graph by p x = 1 − p 0 − p y . Then the indifference curves under EU in the triangle diagram are straight lines with the same slope, which illustrates the property of linearity in probabilities. Attitude to risk can also be illustrated in the unit triangle where relatively steep utility indifference curves represent risk aversion and relatively flat utility indifference curves represent risk loving. 
Direct Applications of Distorted Independence Axiom
In this section, we show the significance of DIA. We use DIA directly to rationalize two famous examples -the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect. The two examples are inconsistent with IA and EU, but may agree with RDEU, which can be checked by applying RDEU formulas (3.4) -(3.7) (Segal 1987a and 1989) . Using DIA directly, we can determine the functional forms of the distortion function such that the two examples are paradoxical.
Furthermore, we look beyond these functional forms and are able to obtain conditions under which the two examples accord with DIA.
In order to explain the roles played by IA and DIA for the two examples, we will use isosceles right triangles in Machina (1987) . As he demonstrates in his well-known article, the set of all prospects over the fixed outcome levels 0 < x < y can be represented by the set of all probability triples of the form (p 0 , p x , p y ) where p 0 = P {X = 0}, p x = P {X = x}, p y = P {X = y}, and p 0 +p x +p y = 1. Graphically, this set of gambles can be represented in two dimensions, in (p 0 , p y ) plane (Figure 4 .1), since the third dimension, p x , is implicit in the graph by p x = 1 − p 0 − p y .
Then the indifference curves under EU in the triangle diagram are straight lines with the same slope, which illustrates the property of linearity in probabilities. Attitude to risk can also be illustrated in the unit triangle where relatively steep utility indifference curves represent risk aversion and relatively flat utility indifference curves represent risk loving. (Segal 1987a (Segal 1987a) . Under IA, A 1 A 2 is only compatible with A 3 A 4 , which we use the unit triangle to illustrate. Later we will apply DIA to the unit triangle to resolve the paradox. Figure 2 shows us the four prospects A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 in the plane (p 0 , p y ), where A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 and
. We can find two pairs of prospects to represent the original four prospects A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , and A 4 . Figure 2 reports how to take the two pairs of new prospects. First, we take point C 2 to be the intersection of line XA 2 and line ZY and point C 1 to be the point on the line XZ such that C 1 C 2 A 1 A 2 . Then we take D 1 to be X (the origin) and D 2 to be Z. The two pairs of prospects are defined
and D 2 = (0, 1). Then A 1 = (1−ε)C 1 + εD 1 and A 2 = (1−ε)C 2 + εD 1 , A 3 = (1−ε)C 1 + εD 2 and A 4 = (1−ε)C 2 + εD 2 . In addition,
A 2 is only compatible with A 3 A 4 .
4.1.1. Under DIA, the distortion function g is the identity if and only if A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 , and in this case A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold simultaneously Now we explain this paradox by directly using DIA. In Figure 3 , we define four CDFs
We take point C 2 to be the intersection of line X A 2 and line Z Y and point C 1 to be the point on the line X Z such that C 1 C 2 A 1 A 2 . Then the two prospects can be expressed as
;
. Figure 4 .3: The Allais Paradox and the Distorted Independence Axiom
FIG. 3. The Allais Paradox and the Distorted Independence Axiom
The condition
Therefore, we have, for any 0 < q < p < 1 and 0 < ε ≤ 1 − p,
Then g −1 (1−p) − g −1 (1−p−ε) is independent of p. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < ε ≤ 1 − p, (1 − p) is a constant and thus g −1 is linear. Since g −1 (0) = 0 and g −1 (1) = 1, then g −1 (p) = p and g(p) = p. Therefore the distortion function g is the identity. In this case A 1 A 2 is only compatible with A 3 A 4 .
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Then g −1 (1−p) − g −1 (1−p−ε) is independent of p. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < ε ≤ 1 − p,
Differentiating (12) with respect to p, we then have [g
is a constant and thus g −1 is linear. Since g −1 (0) = 0 and g −1 (1) = 1, then g −1 (p) = p and g(p) = p. Therefore the distortion function g is the identity. In this case A 1 A 2 is only compatible with A 3 A 4 .
In summary, we find the condition for the distortion function such that A 1 A 2 C 1 C 2 A 3 A 4 and hence
.
Then we have (11) and the distortion function g is the identity. In this case DIA reduces to IA and the RDEU formula reduces to the EU one, and we have A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold simultaneously.
A Closer Look
Now we take a closer look at the Allais paradox by using DIA in the unit triangle. In the left diagram of Figure 3 , the indifference curves under EU are linear; and in the right diagram of Figure 3 which is the transformed triangle, the indifference curves are also linear. Based on Figure 3 , we can use DIA directly to explain the Allais paradox. As we have shown above,
FIG. 4. Rationalization of the Allais Paradox by DIA.
A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 correspond to the cases that g is the identity, g is concave, and g is convex, respectively.
Then we have (4.1) and the distortion function g is the identity. In this case DIA reduces to IA and the RDEU formula reduces to the EU one, and we have A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold simultaneously.
A Closer Look
Now we take a closer look at the Allais paradox by using DIA in the unit triangle. In the left diagram of Figure 4 .3, the indifference curves under EU are linear; and in the right diagram of Figure 4 .3 which is the transformed triangle, the indifference curves are also linear. Based on Figure 4 .3, we can use DIA directly to explain the Allais paradox. As we have shown above,
. Figure 4 we use superscript 0 to replace in A to denote for this case. As we know, under RDEU, A 1 A 2 and A 4 A 3 are compatible if and only if g is concave. Does this result hold under DIA? We discuss the two cases where g is not the identity as follows.
[1] The distortion function g is concave if and only if the weights function g −1 is convex if and only if g
In the right-hand-side of Figure 4 we use superscript 1 to replace in A . In this case, it is possible that A 1 A 2 and A 4 A 3 are compatible.
[2] The distortion function g is convex if and only if the weights function g −1 is concave if and only if g We summarize the above results from the view of DIA as follows. where 0 < x < y, 0 < q < p ≤ 1, and 0 < λ < 1. Most people prefer A 1 to A 2 and A 4 to A 3 (MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979). However, they are not consistent with IA or EU. MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) take the parameter values as x = $1m, y = $5m, p = 1.00, q = 0.80, and λ = 0.05.
The distortion function g is the identity if and only if
In Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , x = 3000, y = 4000, p = 1.00, q = 0.80, and λ = 0.25. EU implies that A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 are equivalent. Under RDEU A 1 A 2 and A 4 A 3 are compatible if and only if the elasticity of the weights function f is increasing (Segal 1987a) . Under IA, F A1 F A2 implies F A3 F A4 , which we illustrate in the unit triangle. Later we will apply DIA to the unit triangle to resolve the common ratio effect. Figure 5 shows us the four prospects A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 in the plane (p 0 , p y ), where (Segal 1987a) . Under IA, F A1 F A2 implies F A3 F A4 , which we illustrate in the unit triangle.
Later we will apply DIA to the unit triangle to resolve the common ratio effect. 
We take D such that
4.2.1. Under DIA, the weights function f is of constant elasticity if and only if A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 , and in this case A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold simultaneously Now we explain this example by using DIA. Define two new prospects to be A 1 = (0, g −1 (1−p); x, 1 − g −1 (1−p)) and A 2 = (0, g −1 (1−q); y, 1 − g −1 (1−q)) such that their CDFs F A 1 and F A 2 in F satisfy F A1 = g•F A 1 and F A2 = g•F A 2 , as illustrated in Figure 6 . By DIA,
which assigns the value z with probability 1. Then the random variable is δ z = (z, 1) and hence G 0 = F D = F D .
FIG. 6. The Common Ratio Effect and the Distorted Independence Axiom
to be a CDF for a degenerate distribution which assigns the value z with probability 1. Then the random variable is δ z = (z, 1) and hence We now find Figure 4 .6). In this case, A 3 A 4 A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 .
Thus for any 0 < q < p < 1 and 0 < λ < 1,
is independent of p. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < λ < 1,
with R(1) = 1. Differentiating (4.4) with respect to p and λ, we then have
We now find Figure 6 ). In this case, A 3 A 4 A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 .
Then
is independent of p. For any 0 < p < 1 and 0 < λ <
with R(1) = 1. Differentiating (14) with respect to p and λ, we then have
Thus λR (λ) = R (1)R(λ) and hence
When p approaches unity in (14), we have the limit as 1 − g −1 (1−λ) = R(λ). It follows, from (15), g −1 (1−λ) = 1−λ R (1) and g(1−λ R (1) ) = 1−λ. Therefore
Therefore, under DIA, A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 if and only if the distortion function g satisfies g(p) = 1 − (1−p) γ where γ > 0, and in this case both A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold together. The value of α in (13) is chosen such that A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 and hence
We can then conclude that the distortion function g is of the form
γ with γ > 0, then the function f (p) defined in Section 3 becomes p γ , and hence the elasticity of f , which is defined as p f (p) f (p) , equals to
Therefore under DIA, both A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold if and only if the elasticity of the weights function f is a positive constant.
A Closer Look
The common ratio effect example is also regarded as irrational behavior under IA and EU. However, the inconsistent result holds when the distortion function g satisfies g(p) = 1 − (1−p) γ where γ > 0 under DIA (which is IA when γ = 1). Under RDEU, the paradox can disappear when the corresponding weights function has an increasing elasticity.
As for the explanation for the Allais paradox, we turn to the unit triangle to explain the common ratio effect by directly using DIA, which is illustrated in Figure 6 . As we know,
Now we can find the relation between the function f
which is the inverse of the elasticity of h at h −1 (p). As we know, the elasticity of the weights function f is a positive constant, 
FIG. 7.
Rationalization of the Common Ratio Effect by the distorted independence axiom. A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 correspond to the cases that the elasticity of the weights function f is constant, increasing, and decreasing, respectively. Now we can find the relation between the function f (p) = 1−g(1−p) and h(p) = 1−g −1 (1−p)
as follows:
which is the inverse of the elasticity of h at h −1 (p). A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 correspond to the cases that the elasticity of the weights function f is constant, increasing, and decreasing, respectively.
As we know, the elasticity of the weights function f is a positive constant, In the right-hand-side of Figure 7 we use superscript 1 to replace in A . Thus, the elasticity of the weights function f is increasing if and only if Slope of A 1 1 A 1 2 > Slope of A 1 3 A 1 4 . In this case, it is possible that A 1 A 2 and A 4 A 3 are compatible.
[2] The elasticity of the weights function f is decreasing if and only if the elasticity of the weights function h is increasing if and only if
In the right-hand-side of Figure 7 we use superscript 2 to replace in A . Thus, the elasticity of the weights function f is decreasing if and only if Slope of A 2 1 A 2 2 < Slope of A 2 3 A 2 4 . In this case, A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 are compatible.
We summarize the above results from the view of DIA as follows.
1. The weights function f satisfies f (p) = p γ where γ > 0 if and only if A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 . In this case both A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 hold together.
2. The weights function f is of increasing elasticity if and only if Slope of A 1 A 2 > Slope of A 3 A 4 , and it is possible that A 1 A 2 and A 4 A 3 are compatible.
3. The weights function f is of decreasing elasticity if and only if Slope of A 1 A 2 < Slope of A 3 A 4 , then A 1 A 2 and A 3 A 4 are compatible. Machina (1987) uses the unit triangle to explain the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect. In his diagrams, prospects are fixed and form parallelograms, but indifference curves fan out. In this paper, we examine the examples from a different angle. We transform the unit triangle under the framework of DIA, as in Figures 4 and 7 . Here, indifference curves keep parallel but lines of the compared prospect pairs are fanning in in the following two cases -[1] the distortion function g is concave for the Allais paradox and [2] the weights function f is of increasing elasticity for the common ratio effect. Then the behavioral patterns in these paradoxes may be rational.
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
In this paper, we build the distorted theory under risk, which is also called the RDEU theory (Quiggin 1982 , Segal 1989 , and Quiggin and Wakker 1994 . We first provide a brief outline of Quiggin's (1982) RDEU formula. Following Quiggin's (1982) assumption that the transformation of CDFs is a continuous function of the whole probability distribution, we show, by induction to reduce the dimensions of lotteries, that the RDEU formula holds over lotteries. Besides, this formula can also be proved for general random variables. The rank-dependent expected utility on risks is represented by mathematical expectations of a utility function with respect to a transformation of probabilities on the set of outcomes.
Then we axiomatize the distorted theory of rank-dependent expected utility. We notice that the function which distorts decision-makers' beliefs is also a CDF. It follows that the distorted CDF is the compound of the distortion function and the CDF of a risky prospect. From this approach we construct our DIA, and hence provide the representation theorem of RDEU by modifying EU (Fishburn 1982 and Yaari 1987) .
The RDEU formula can be used to explain the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect (Segal 1987a (Segal , 1989 , and even the Ellsberg paradox (Segal 1987b) . While the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect are inconsistent with EU, they may accord with RDEU. As we know, IA is a special case of DIA. Consequently, the paradoxes under IA may constitute rational behaviors under our DIA. In this paper, we transform the unit triangle in Machina (1987) to the framework of DIA, in which the indifference curves remain parallel but the positions of prospects change. We show that when the distortion function take specific forms, lines of compared prospect pairs fan in and thus the behavioral pattern in these examples may be rational.
APPENDIX A [Proof of Theorem 1]:
We prove the expressions (2)-(3) by induction. It is very easy to check the cases of N = 1, 2, 3. Supposing the result holds for N , we want to prove that it also holds for N + 1.
For the case of N + 1,
From (1) and (A.1) we have, for n = 2, · · · , N ,
We next consider the cases of k = 2, · · · , N − 1. As x
From (2) and (A.3) we have
).
(A.5)
From (3) and (A.3) we have, for n = 2, · · · , k − 1,
From (3) and (A.4) we have, for n = k + 1, · · · , N , That is, the non-decreasing sequence of CDFs {F N : N = 1, 2, · · · } converges to F X . It follows that, from the continuity of function g, That is, the non-decreasing sequence of CDFs {g•F N : N = 1, 2, · · · } converges to g•F X .
Since U is a continuous and increasing von Neumann -Morgenstern utility function on [m, M ], then we have, by Helly Theorem in Chow and Ticher (1988) , Therefore F X (X) follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1] .
If the random variable θ follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], for any CDF F , P {F −1 (θ) ≤ x} = P {θ ≤ F (x)} = F (x).
Therefore F −1 (θ) follows the CDF F . Checking Axioms A1 -A4, we find that they hold for * on F if and only if they hold for on F • . Axioms A1, A2, and A4 are straightforward. Now we check Axiom A3 as follows.
Let g•F and g•F belong to F • . Since g satisfies Lipschitz condition, then there exists a positive number K 1 > 0 such that, for p 1 and p 2 in [0, 1], |g(p 1 ) − g(p 2 )| ≤ K 1 |p 1 − p 2 |. Then the L 1 -norms are equivalent on F and F • . Furthermore, * satisfies Axiom A5EU if and only if satisfies Axiom A5.
If F 1 , F 2 and F belong to F and α is a real number satisfying 0 < α < 1, and F 1 * Hence, from Theorem 3, it follows that satisfies Axioms A1 -A5 if and only if * has the appropriate expected utility representation. In other words, satisfies Axioms A1 -A5 if and only if there exists a continuous and non-decreasing real function u, defined on [m, M ], such that, for all X 1 and X 2 belonging to L ,
